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For more than fifty years, Japan’s foreign policy was strongly marked by its defeat by the allied 
powers in World War II and the beginning of Cold War bipolarity. In addition to becoming an 
economic superpower and establishing constitutional pacifism as the bedrock of its political 
system, Japan also became an ‘outstanding partner’ for the United States. This formula – the 
so-called Yoshida doctrine – permitted Japan to focus on economic growth and wealth, leaving 
security matters to the United States. Despite the anomaly that Japan represented during this 
period of bipolarity, its strategy allowed the country to achieve security and prosperity. 
However, the Yoshida doctrine was not designed for the uncertain post-Cold War order.   
Following almost five decades of occupying this “abnormal” place on the world stage, 
Japan entered a new period in which new challenges have arisen as a consequence of changes 
in both the international and domestic systems. For Japan, the demise of the bipolar system 
meant that the Soviet Union was no longer the most significant threat to its security. At the 
same time, the collapse of the political party system in 1993 had a major impact on Japan’s 
institutional framework, facilitating a more pro-active and assertive global profile. In post-Cold 
War Japan, therefore, the country’s main concerns can be said to be the fear of abandonment 
and entrapment by the United States, the relative decline of its economy, the ongoing threats 
posed by North Korea to Japanese territory, and, last but not least, the uncertain rise of China.   
In particular, the re-emergence of China as a regional and global power has become an 
issue of special concern in a period of multi-polarity and power transition and Japan’s strategy 
towards the rise of China in the post-Cold War period is significant for several reasons. First 
of all, although Japan is not the main player that has to deal with the systemic issue of the rise 
of China, the Japanese reaction to the re-emergence of China will be an essential factor in 
determining the balance of power in East Asia. The two countries are the most powerful actors 
in this region and their strategies towards each other have regional and global consequences 
for the balance of power. In world history, China – as a rising power – and Japan – as a declining 
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power – have never before shared equal power status at the same time and, so, like two large 
carps in a small pond, they must confront each other in troubled waters. Secondly, Japan 
remains the US’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific region and, as such, Japan’s response 
to China’s rise has a great impact not only on the US-Japan alliance but also on US strategy 
vis-à-vis the rise of China. Thirdly, Japan and China have great mutual economic interests, 
both in terms of trade and investment, and their economic interdependence has grown in recent 
decades, with obvious consequences for regional and global economies. Lastly, Japan has to 
devise a China strategy consistent with its overall foreign policy for the 21st century: a course 
that is coherent with what has been described as the “normalization” of Japanese diplomacy. 
In order to find its place in the world, Japan must decide how to deal with China’s rise.1 This 
onerous task means charting the right course between a declining United States and the 
uncertain emergence of China. 
Assuming that Japan can be considered a ‘middle power’, from the 1990s onwards it 
can be seen to have been pursuing a “hedging” strategy in its relations with Beijing. Although 
China probably represents the greatest potential military threat to Japan, in order to avoid 
tensions between the two, it has not been officially recognized as such. Japan is not balancing 
against China, but neither is it bandwagoning with it or taking a neutral stance to the rise of 
China. If Japan were a superpower with hegemonic ambitions, Tokyo would no doubt have 
pursued a pure balancing strategy. However, it has followed a middle course, adopting a 
hedging strategy coherent with its middle-power status. 
The central argument of this article is that Japan has pursued a hedging strategy during 
the post-Cold War era (1995-2016), which is best analyzed in terms of Kuik’s 2 understanding 
of hedging, rather than by applying alternative interpretations of the concept. 3 This article 
therefore provides an insight into the conceptualization of hedging as a strategy in International 
Relations (IR). Although a considerable number of studies have examined the rise of China 
and the reaction of other states to it, very few studies to date have sought to do so by applying 
the concept of hedging from IR theory and security studies in a systematic, coherent and 
rigorous fashion. There is a tendency in the literature to consider recent changes in Japan’s 
security policy as a desire to become a militaristic power or even as a return to Japan’s pre-war 
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regime. However, as this article demonstrates, after the Cold War Japan is an abnormal middle 
power that seeks to normalize its position in the international system in line with its economic 
and diplomatic weight.  
This study is divided into four sections. Following on from this introduction, the second 
section outlines the different approaches offered by IR theorists regarding the way in which 
countries might behave towards a rising power. It is widely held that states either balance 
against a rising power or bandwagon with it; yet, as this article shows, an array of alternatives 
arise if we do not limit ourselves solely to these two mainstream schools in IR. Given the 
theoretical limitations, this article proposes an appropriate framework in which to analyze 
Japan’s China policy, adapting Kuik’s hedging concept to the case of Japan. In the third section 
of the article, we examine the recent evolution in Japan’s policy towards China in the post-
Cold War era and describe how Japan’s strategy has shifted away from “friendship diplomacy” 
towards a new paradigm that is better described in terms of the hedging concept. In the fourth 
section, we apply this hedging framework to the recent evolution in Japanese foreign policy in 
order to determine whether Kuik’s framework fits the Japanese case. In the final section we 
draw our conclusions and offer some final remarks. 
 
International Relations Theory and Rising Powers 
IR theory provides an array of competing perspectives and paradigms that are generally 
regarded as mutually exclusive. In the middle of this heated paradigmatic debate, it is crucial 
to observe how the literature has sought to explain the behavior of states in periods of power 
transition. The leading voice of offensive realism is that of John J. Mearsheimer, who, in The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), analyses how great powers behave and why they 
decide to go to war. One of Mearsheimer’s main assumption is that state’s intentions can be 
benign one day and hostile the next, therefore no state can be sure whether or not another state 
will initiate an aggression. 4 Accordingly, survival is the primary goal of any power and the 
“lust for power” causes states to compete with each other to maximize their share of it.  
Whereas all states have revisionist intentions and there are no status quo powers in the 
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international system, it is highly unlikely that a state will attain global hegemony.5 Thus, the 
world is condemned to “perpetual great-power competition”, which is a cruel and no less 
pessimistic description of the world.6 An additional assumption is that states are rational actors 
behaving in an anarchic world, and they are inclined to behave strategically when it comes to 
survival. When the costs of altering the balance of power are too high, states tend to bide their 
time until the risks are not so great. 
In seeking to respond to the question as to how states react to a rising power, 
Mearsheimer identifies four possible strategies: bandwagoning, appeasement, balancing and 
buck-passing. The first strategy involves joining forces with a more powerful opponent in the 
hope of sharing some of the benefits with the ascendant power. Nevertheless, betting on the 
“surefire winner” in the hope of obtaining economic benefits is clearly a strategy for the weak. 
In the case of the second strategy, appeasement, Mearsheimer claims that states choose this 
approach so that they can “push the aggressor in a more pacific direction and turn it into a status 
quo power”.7 Considering that states react to hegemonic powers as they feel “vulnerable”, this 
strategy seeks to downsize that sense of insecurity and, consequently, the reasons for possible 
aggression.  
However, in the real world, states tend to consider the worst-case scenario and so adopt 
a balancing strategy, which can take the form of either internal or external balancing. When 
states balance internally, they seek to increase their own military capabilities to counter the 
rising power; when they do so externally, they seek alliances with other states to balance against 
a threatening state. Lastly, states adopting the buck-passing strategy seek to transfer the burden 
of deterring or attacking a rising power. States are quite likely to adopt this strategy in multi-
polar systems and highly unlikely to do so in bipolar systems. 
Unlike realists, liberals and constructivists consider the international system as being 
governed by a set of rules and agreements. The absence of a central government in the 
international system far from impeding cooperation actually facilitates stability. Consequently, 
order does not emerge from the balance of power, but rather from different levels of 
government made up of institutions, laws, agreements, standards and norms. Yet, how do 
weaker states deal with a rising power? According to liberals, weaker powers tend to cooperate 
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with stronger states and to induce favorable intentions by promoting economic relations and by 
including rising powers in international institutions. Constructivists believe a peaceful rise is 
possible, but it must be a two-way process, in which the rising power accommodates itself to 
the rules and structures of international society.8 
However, none of these theories seems to offer plausible explanations for Japan’s 
reaction to China’s rise. Contrary to what many realists suggest,9 Japan is not becoming a great 
military power. Even though Japan has the capacity to become a nuclear power and could 
change its military doctrine of “defensive defense” to one of “offensive defense”, it has chosen 
not to develop its capabilities in an offensive way. Constitutional limitations10 and Japanese 
anti-militarism do not make the country’s remilitarization impossible; however, it is highly 
unlikely. According to an opinion poll conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun in 2014, 60 percent of 
public opinion is against making changes to Article 9, compared with 46.7 percent in 2004.11 
As Midford states, no other second-ranked economic power has preserved such a limited 
defense capability in recent world history.12  
Japan is not powerful enough to deal with the systemic problem of China’s rise alone 
and must rely on the United States to handle the question of power transition. At the global 
level, the United States is the only superpower capable of dealing with the rise of China on its 
own. Yet, at the regional level it needs Japan when dealing with China, since middle powers 
remain essential to great powers to help reduce regional security dilemmas within an uncertain 
multi-polar system.13 Finally, if we consider Japan as being a middle power, such states do not 
adopt pure forms of balancing or bandwagoning,14 but rather a mixed strategy. This is what we 
analyze in the following section.  
 
 
Hedging as an answer to rising powers 
As we shall see below in section 3, the empirical evidence indicates that Japan, contrary to 
realist arguments, is willing neither to balance against Chinese power nor to bandwagon with 
it. Moreover, neither is Japan pursuing what liberals suggest should be the normal path: 
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economically engaging China in order to benefit from trade and investment with the rising 
power. Recent trends in Chinese-Japanese relations show how, despite their mutual economic 
interdependence, neither country is adhering to a purely cooperative strategy but rather that 
they have adopted elements of a hedging strategy too. In short, Japan currently adheres to a 
mixed strategy, described by various authors as a hedging strategy.15 Yet, most of these studies 
do not examine the theoretical concept in any great depth and apply it in a very broad sense, 
with a meaning that ranges from simple engagement to more complex counterbalancing 
policies. 
One of the first authors to speak of hedging in this context was Denny Roy, whose 
coining of the term provides us with a good starting point for our discussion. Roy argues that 
in facing a potential regional hegemon, states have four choices: balancing, bandwagoning, 
engagement or hedging. Accordingly, states adopt a hedging strategy (which may or may not 
include balancing) when there is a high degree of uncertainty about a rising power’s real 
intentions. As such, hedging is understood as a general strategy that entails “keeping open more 
than one strategic option against the possibility of a future security threat.”16 While it is true 
that Roy does not develop the concept theoretically and does not propose a model applicable 
to middle powers, he does contribute one fundamental idea: in the international arena, risks and 
imminent threats determine when a state must decide whether to accept, accommodate or reject 
a given rising power. Mearsheimer claims that when a state perceives an imminent threat, it 
balances, bandwagons or adopts other intermediate strategies, such as appeasement or buck-
passing. However, what happens when the threat is not so obviously imminent? In such 
circumstances, Roy suggests that powers tend to hedge. 
 Jeffrey Hornung has recently undertaken an analysis of Japan’s response to the rise of 
China by employing a spectrum of strategies that ranges from pure balancing to pure 
engagement at the two ends of a continuum. 17 Between these two extremes, he locates the 
strategy of both soft and hard hedging. For Hornung, a soft hedge involves fostering 
cooperatives policies with the rising power, including the promotion of diplomatic and 
economic ties. In contrast, a hard hedge involves adopting a set of strategies more similar in 
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nature to balancing, including the beefing up of one’s defensive capabilities or the forging of 
alliances with other powers.  
Although Hornung undertakes a highly systematic analysis of Japanese strategy vis-à-
vis China and illustrates how Japan is employing policies that combine elements of both 
engagement and balancing, his framework of enquiry presents three weaknesses. Firstly, he 
considers engagement, not balancing, as the opposite strategy to that of bandwagoning, arguing 
that the former depends on cooperative policies and the promise of rewards, as opposed to the 
use of force. For the author, bandwagoning is the strategy of weak states. However, the term 
bandwagoning has been used elsewhere not only to mean aligning oneself with the most 
powerful ally in order to avoid being attacked,18 but also as a way to obtain gains and rewards 
from allying with the most powerful state.19 Thus, bandwagoning constitutes an option for 
weaker states, which want to offset the risk of being attacked, and an engagement strategy for 
middle powers, which view an alliance as a positive-sum game.  
Secondly, for Hornung, hedging does not constitute a set of multiple options that can 
be employed simultaneously. Although the author identifies hedging as a strategy that 
combines elements of both engagement and balancing, in his analysis of Japan’s strategy, the 
term, and its different degrees (both hard and soft), is ultimately used as a synonym of 
balancing. Hornung does not employ the term hedging as an intermediate strategy that might 
simultaneously include a mix of tools of cooperation and containment; rather, hedging is 
understood as a form of engagement or balancing, or at the most, a binding mechanism, and 
not as a complex and systematic concept. 
Finally, the notions of “uncertainty” and “risk” are treated in Hornung in line with 
realist tenets, that is, understanding them in political or military terms. However, a distinction 
needs to be drawn between imminent and non-imminent risks. When a country such as Japan 
faces no imminent threats, it tends to hedge. However, what occurs when a country faces a 
direct threat? In such circumstances, countries do not adopt an engagement policy but a pure 
balancing or bandwagoning strategy.  
Kuik provides one of the first systematic theoretical analyses of hedging behavior in 
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IR. According to the author, the concept of hedging refers to “a behavior in which a country 
seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually 
counteracting effects, under the situation of high uncertainties and high stakes”. 20 In common 
with Mearsheimer and Roy, Kuik reminds us that in the realm of international politics, risks 
and imminent threats are what make states accept, accommodate or reject a particular rising 
power. When a state perceives a rising power as an imminent security threat, it will pursue a 
balancing strategy vis-à-vis the actor; in contrast, when a state views an actor as a principal 
source of aid, then it is likely to opt for bandwagoning. Yet, what occurs when a state does not 
perceive any imminent or obvious threat? When states are unable to develop overly close or 
overly distant relations with a major power or when they are unsure as to which bandwagon 
they should “jump” on, they have a tendency to hedge. Hedging is a strategy that “aims for the 
best and prepares for the worst”.21 
 
Table 1: Hedging Strategies in Response to the Rise of a Great Power, According to 
Kuik 
 
Kuik considers hedging as constituting a set of policies that simultaneously pursue 
counteractions aimed at maximizing options and avoiding risks. On the one hand, there are the 
return-maximizing options, which include economic-pragmatism, binding-engagement and 
limited- bandwagoning. The term economic-pragmatism is defined in Kuik as an attempt to 
maximize gains from a rising power through the establishment of direct trade and investment 
links, in spite of any political or security concerns that might exist between the two. The middle 
power, without accepting or denying the political authority of the rising power, regards the 
latter as an economic power that provides it with economic opportunities.  
The concept of binding-engagement refers to the situation in which a middle power 
decides to establish formal contacts with a rising power in the hope of creating channels of 
communication and of socializing the power into the established order, with the ultimate goal 
of influencing the power’s policy choices. The middle power seeks to ensure that the rising 
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power forms part of the international community, adheres to status-quo norms and is a 
responsible stakeholder thereof.   
Other states adopt a limited-bandwagoning approach to the rising power, which consists 
of forming a political partnership in order to obtain present or future rewards from it, without 
losing any autonomy or eroding its current relationship with any other dominant power. 
On the other hand, there are various risk-contingency options that entail indirect-
balancing and dominance-denial. Dominance-denial is adopted when a country seeks to prevent 
or deny the emergence of a rising power in a region where it might pose a challenge to the 
status quo. Two actions can contribute to this process: the involvement of other powers in 
regional affairs and the development of its own diplomatic and security tools. While binding-
engagement aims at engaging the rising power in a region, dominance-denial seeks to prevent 
its dominance and any hegemonic desire it might entertain. 
Finally, indirect-balancing involves balancing militarily (both internally and externally) 
the uncertain power of a rising state, without specifically recognizing that it constitutes a 
military threat. By adopting this strategy, a middle power seeks to forge an alliance with other 
powers, while at the same time modernizing its defense capabilities but without specifically 
targeting the rising power. While pure balancing strategies represent a clear-cut military policy 
of containment against a specific threat, an indirect balancing strategy sees a state acting in 
case an uncertain situation arises. 
Although Kuik uses his hedging model to account for the behavior of small states 
(primarily in South-East Asia) in the face of a rising power, it is our firm contention that this 
same concept can be used to explain the behavior of a middle power like Japan. To identify a 
middle-power state, the most traditional approach is to aggregate material criteria and to rank 
economic capabilities.22 However, this approach overlooks a very important quality of any 
middle-power state, namely, its behavioral attributes. Jordaan 23  offers a more complete 
characterization that sees a middle power as an actor that is stable, wealthy and democratic, 
and which employs a foreign policy centered on the taking of multilateral initiatives. Moreover, 
a middle power seeks to be a stabilizer of the current global order and does not attempt to 
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jeopardize it. 
In analyzing the concept of ‘middle power’ as applied to Japan, the most frequently 
adopted definition is that proposed by Yoshihide Soeya.24 Thus, the chief characteristics of 
Japan as a middle power are its 1) commitment to multilateralism; 2) the high degree of civil 
society participation that occurs in its foreign policy; and, 3) a national identity inextricably 
tied to peacekeeping activities, human security and comprehensive security. 
This definition is very much in line with our own understanding of a middle power and 
facilitates our understanding of Japan’s current role in the international community. Japan is 
neither a small nor a great power. Although it has the capacity to become a great power, since 
1945 it has opted not to take this path and to concentrate instead on its middle-power profile 
on the international stage. In spite of Shinzo Abe’s recent measures in the realm of security, 
Japan continues to adhere to a diplomacy that is committed to multilateralism, peacekeeping 
operations and limited participation in security activities.  
 
Japan’s Policy Towards China 
In order to understand recent changes in Japan’s policy towards China and to comprehend its 
current hedging strategy, in this section we outline the policy evolution from two perspectives: 
first, in terms of Japan’s political and security relationship with China from the 1970s down to 
the present day and, second, in terms of their economic relationship over the last forty years. 
In so doing, we consider not only Japan’s strategy as two faces of the same coin, but we also 
identify the distinct paradigms adopted by Japan during the Cold and post-Cold War periods. 
 
Politics and security 
The basic framework of relations between Japan and China lie in the 1972 Sino-Japanese 
Communiqué and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which normalized diplomatic 
relations between the two countries and ushered in almost twenty years of uninterrupted 
cooperation – a period referred to by both parties as an “era of unprecedented friendship”. In 
line with a policy of seikei bunri, that is, the separation of economics and politics, China and 
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Japan began to promote mutual trade deals.25 It was no coincidence that in 1979 the Japanese 
government launched its first package of Official Development Assistance (comprising loans, 
grant aid, and technical cooperation) aimed at promoting stability and growth in China.26 This 
assistance program represented a form of compensation for the damage inflicted on the Chinese 
people, but Tokyo was very much of the opinion that a prosperous China would make a good 
friend. 
However, in this period characterized by the so-called “friendship diplomacy”, a certain 
amount of friction was evident in the relations between the two countries. The main disputes 
centered on Japan’s military past and controversies concerning the so-called rekishi ninshiki 
(recognition of history), and the Taiwan question. In relation to this first conflict, although 
Japan officially expressed its deep remorse (fukaku hansei) in the preamble to the 1972 Sino-
Japanese Joint Communiqué and later issued an apology (owabi) for its aggressive past, the 
situation was soured by the Japanese school textbook controversy in the early 1980s.27 
In 1982, the media reported that the Japanese Ministry of Education had introduced 
changes in a history textbook describing the country’s military presence in China during the 
1930s and 40s not as an aggression (shinryaku) but rather as an advance into (shinshutsu) the 
territory. Following protests and riots in China against this historical revisionism, the Japanese 
government chose to introduce new guidelines. In this period of transition to a market economy, 
the majority of Liberal Democratic Party members undertook not to damage the relationship 
and to avoid destabilizing relations with China. The Japanese government announced that 
Tokyo had a significant role to play in helping the Chinese economic transformation. Thus, any 
tensions in the post-normalization process were framed in a structure that permitted both 
countries to ignore any matters that might give rise to immediate trouble, thereby allowing both 
parties to enjoy an apparent friendship.28 Conflicts, rather than being solved, were “shelved”, 
their resolution being put off for a later date. In cultural terms, both countries were concerned 
about their public face (tatemae), but they did not go very far in resolving frictions and 
eliminating feelings of mistrust (honne). 
However, it was not until the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 that the first 
cracks began to appear in the “friendship diplomacy”. Although Japan imposed only light 
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sanctions on China,29 several incidents strengthened the idea that “friendship diplomacy” was 
insufficient to persuade China to behave benignly. Since that date, various developments, 
above all in the security realm, have shifted Japanese perceptions about China in a negative 
direction. 
The ongoing dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese Law of the 
Territorial Sea of 1992,30 Chinese nuclear testing (1995) and military exercises in the Taiwan 
Strait during the Taiwanese presidential election in 1996, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
dispute, and China’s military build-up were all matters that gave the Japanese government 
cause for concern and cast doubts on China’s rise as an emerging power in the new century. 
Yet, rather than adopting a pure balancing strategy, in the years following 1996 Japan initiated 
a mixed strategy that included elements of engagement with and moderate balancing against 
China’s rise. 
Thus, following an initial period in which Japan feared it might be abandoned by the 
United States, Tokyo and Washington actually strengthened their alliance in order to safeguard 
Japan’s security and uphold regional stability. The 1996 Joint Security Declaration signed by 
Hashimoto and Clinton, the 1997 New Defense Cooperation Guidelines, along with 
undertakings to conduct joint technical research on Ballistic Missile Defense, demonstrated 
both parties’ willingness to reaffirm the alliance. In addition, soon after this, Japan started to 
build up its defense system and purchased ballistic missile defense capability. China 
complained that Japan might use this capability in a hypothetical Taiwan-China war, with 
Japanese ships combining with US forces to defend Taiwan. 
At the same time, a more pro-active Japanese foreign policy in the security realm, 
combined with US insistence that Japan should contribute to regional and international security 
(and so abandon its hitherto position as a free-rider), mean this alliance has become the 
lynchpin of US strategy in Asia. Following a period in which the US sought to rebalance its 
strategy, and after a shift in the center of gravity away from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific 
region, the alliance with Japan remains, in the words of Caroline Kennedy, the US Ambassador 
to Japan, “the cornerstone of peace, stability and prosperity in the region”.31   
In the interim, North Korea has become the main official threat to Japan’s security, 
                  13 
 
particularly after the build-up of tension in 1993-1994 in response to North Korea’s nuclear 
program and its firing in 1998 of Nodong- and Taepodong-type missiles over Japan, followed 
by nuclear tests conducted in 2006, 2009, and 2013. However, when it comes to China, Japan 
has deliberately pursued a more ambiguous strategy and rhetoric. In the 1996 Joint Security 
Declaration, Japan referred to China as a country with which cooperation was extremely 
important for reasons of regional stability and prosperity, although it left these words very 
much open to interpretation. Officially, Japan’s deployment of its ballistic system at that time 
was aimed at combating North Korea’s persistent threat to the country’s integrity. It was not 
until the end of the 1990s that China and Japan began to identify each other as strategic rivals. 
One of the main concerns for Japan stems from the lack of transparency in China’s 
increasing military expenditure and the unclear intentions behind its military build-up. 
According to Defense of Japan 2006, China’s defense expenditure might be even higher than 
officially reported, since no equipment procurement or research and development costs are 
included in official figures. Although China’s military budget in 2015 was declared at around 
145,900 million dollars, according to SIPRI the real expenditure is probably about 214,500 
million dollars, that is, a rise of near 8 percent on the previous year. Moreover, in the last 25 
years, China’s military expenditure has increased more than thirty-fold, and Japan’s fear is that 
the actual rate is much higher. Japan, on the other hand, adhered to its policy of keeping its 
military budget below a ceiling of 1 percent of its GDP, until Shinzo Abe came to power. In 
2012, total expenditure on self-defense stood at around 60,000 million dollars, a sizeable figure 
for a peace-loving country. However, in practice, the amount spent on defense is higher than 
that reported by the Japanese government and if we estimate the expenditure in accordance 
with the NATO model (as employed by European countries), the amount is even greater.32 
Furthermore, if we include spending on the Japanese Coast Guard, a paramilitary force created 
to defend its maritime zone, the final figure rises notably.33 
Moreover, since the Chinese government’s main security concern is maritime, its 
military build-up is concentrated in the naval field and Beijing is seeking to convert its fleet 
from a green-water into a blue-water navy with the acquisition of destroyers, submarines, and 
aircraft carriers. This, in part, accounts for the constant intrusion of Chinese vessels and 
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warships in the EEZ in waters near to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Chunxiao 
gas field in the East China Sea. In 2013 the number of skirmishes involving the Chinese and 
Japanese naval forces intensified considerably, reaching their zenith with the unilateral 
declaration of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone over the disputed Senkaku 
Island in November 2013.Despite the security issues raised by China’s action for the East Asian 
region, Japan responded with considerable restraint to the Chinese military build-up, constant 
maritime activity and lack of transparency. Indeed, the National Defense Program Guidelines 
of 2004, 2010 and 2013 do not refer to China as a “threat”, but prefer more ambiguous terms 
such as “concern”.34 Japan considers a full-scale invasion from any country improbable and 
places the emphasis on new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and international terrorism.  
After the the victory of the DPJ at the 2009 elections and despite the expectations ushered 
in, Japanese foreign policy has not experienced any fundamental shift away from the Yoshida 
Doctrine. Beyond the noise caused by clashes with the United States over the Futenma air 
station, and with China over the Senkaku Islands, the DPJ failed to turn most of its manifesto 
promises into reality. Far from developing closer strategic ties with the major Asian states such 
as China, Japan has not weakened its alliance with the United States, opting to strengthen 
defense cooperation and mutual interoperability, and at the same time Tokyo has adopted a 
number of decisions in the security realm in line with those of the previous Liberal Democratic 
administration. However, the introduction of the 2010 National Defense Program represented 
a shift in Japan’s traditional “basic defense force” stance to a more operationally oriented 
“dynamic defense” posture.35  
Following the election of Shinzo Abe in his landslide lower-house victory in 2012, 
Japanese foreign policy has undergone major changes, especially with regard to its hedging 
strategy. The so-called ‘Abe Doctrine’ is based on three main pillars: expanding Japan’s 
defense capabilities, broadening the US-Japanese alliance, and strengthening security 
cooperation with third partners in the international community so that Japan can participate in 
certain coalitions in the security realm. 
Japanese national security under the present administration embraces what Abe refers to 
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as “proactive pacifism” (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi), that is, Japan is a “normal” country with 
the right to use military power to solve international disputes.  To achieve this, and given the 
impossibility of amending the country’s Pacifist Constitution, Abe opted for a reinterpretation 
of Article 9, allowing Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense should Japan and its 
citizens be exposed to a clear threat and there were no other way to repel the attack other than 
by the use of the minimal force necessary.36  
Critics claim that these new measures seek to introduce radical changes in Japanese 
foreign policy and that they constitute a direct balancing strategy against China. However, far 
from facilitating war-mongering, the new interpretation of the right to collective self-defense 
means that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can come to the aid of any allies that might 
come under attack, especially the United States, and indirectly balance against China in the 
event of an imminent threat by either increasing its own capabilities or in cooperation with its 
allies, most notably Australia and the Philippines.  
At the same time, Abe’s new National Security Strategy has sought to pursue a 
dominance-denial option by enmeshing the likes of South Korea and Australia in some key 
security institutions, by transferring Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships to the Philippines, and 
by transferring technical skills in Coast Guard operations to Indonesia and Malaysia.  
This mixed use of policy tools should be seen as a strategy to help China stabilize its 
economy, as well as a way of ensuring the peaceful emergence of China as a new power and 
of boosting the chances of success of its modernization program.  Consequently, Japan’s 
strategy vis-à-vis China has moved away from the “friendship diplomacy” of the 1970s and 
1980s towards a new paradigm that combines elements of both balancing and engagement. We 
consider the characteristics of the economic engagement policy in the following section. 
 
Economic interdependence of Japan and China 
During the 1980s, economic relations between Japan and China were based on long-term 
bilateral agreements. Japanese exports to China accounted for no more than 7 percent of all its 
exports, while Japanese imports from China accounted for slightly less than 5 percent of all the 
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country’s imports. Owing to the strength of the yen, Japanese labor-intensive industries and 
electrical and electronic goods manufacturers opted to relocate to South-East Asia and China 
in search of high-quality, low-cost labor. 
In the 1990s, trade became more diversified. Japan increased its imports of 
manufactured goods from China, especially traditional goods such as textiles, clothing and 
footwear.37 The volume of trade between the two countries continued to rise, climbing from 
7.2 percent of total Japanese trade in 1990 to 20.9 percent in 2000. Imports of computers and 
other information technology products also grew, and in the case of some consumer electronic 
goods, such as televisions, sales of imported models outstripped those of domestic models.38 
Since the beginning of this century, China became the number one supplier of imports to Japan 
and the latter’s most important export destination, surpassing the United States. At the same 
time, Japan’s chief investment in manufacturing in China occurred via its search for cheap 
labor costs and its efforts to gain a foothold in the dynamic domestic market. 
When China joined the WTO (late 2001), the liberalization of its market and its rapid 
growth attracted large quantities of foreign capital and increased the procurement of all kinds 
of imports. The Chinese procurement boom39 created opportunities for Japanese exports at a 
time when Japanese industry was facing a stagnant domestic market. Japanese steel makers, 
shipbuilders, oil refineries, shippers, construction equipment manufacturers and automobile 
manufacturers all saw a surge in their sales to China. Most of these industries offshored plants 
to China in order to reduce production costs and access the large and growing local market. 
Hornung40 claims that an indication of Japan’s move towards a harder hedge is the 
reduction in its economic ties with China, specifically with regard to trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Yet, China is Japan’s largest trading partner in terms of total trade, and 
imports from China to Japan have grown steadily from 2000 to 2013. Exports from Japan to 
China also grew in 2009 and 2010 but the 2011 earthquake had a significant impact on Japan’s 
automobile and electrical equipment industries; while exports of automobiles recovered in 
parallel with automobile production, exports of electrical equipment, mainly to Asia, took 
longer to recover.41 
As a result of the earthquake, sluggish growth in China and the rapid appreciation of 
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the yen, Japanese exports to China fell from 19.68 percent of total Japanese exports in 2011 to 
18.05 percent in 2012. A similar trend can also be observed in Japanese exports to their other 
major partners in Asia (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore).42 During 2013, 
the depreciation of the yen boosted Japanese exports. On a customs clearance basis, total 
exports amounted to 69.8 trillion yen, up by 9.5 percent on the previous year, and the first 
increase in the previous three years. Exports to Asia increased by 8.6 percent and Japan’s 
exports to China amounted to 12.6 trillion yen, a 9.7 percent increase on the previous year. 
Japanese imports from China amounted to 17.7 trillion yen. As a result, Japanese trade with 
China accounts for 20 percent of the total of Japan’s imports and exports, confirming China as 
Japan’s largest trading partner.43 
After the United States, China is the most important destination for Japanese FDI by 
country. According to Bank of Japan (2014) statistics, Japanese FDI in China jumped from 8.7 
percent of total Japanese FDI in 2003 to 11.7 percent and 11 percent in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively.44 However, as Hornung  45 points out, during the last period 2010-2013, there has 
been an acceleration of Japanese FDI into ASEAN. Table 2 shows Japan’s outward FDI by 
country and region during the period 2009-2013. In 2011 Japan’s FDI increased by 73.9 percent 
on the previous year, the first rise in three years; also in 2013 there was another sharp increase 
in Japan’s FDI, partly reflecting the depreciation of the yen. 46 
 




           
(End of manuscript) 
 
From 2010 onwards, Japan’s investment in ASEAN countries has surpassed that in 
China, except in 2012 as a result of the impact of the floods in Thailand.47 The hike in labor 
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costs in China induced a trend towards the re-shoring of production bases from China.48 Rising 
wages in China have led low-end manufacturers to look for other low-cost locations for their 
factories in Vietnam and the Philippines.  
Intra-industry and intra-firm trade between Japan and China has become increasingly 
dominant compared to the inter-industry trade of the early 1990s, when China mainly exported 
labor- and resource-intensive goods to Japan, and Japan exported capital goods to China. 
China’s changing export pattern is clear: exports to Japan of machinery and transportation 
equipment jumped from 3.8 percent of total Chinese exports to Japan in 1990 to 38.3 percent 
in 2007. At the same time, in 2007, Japanese exports of machinery and transportation 
equipment accounted for 52 percent of total Japanese exports to China.49 A more detailed 
analysis of these patterns reveals that intra-industry trade is predominant in computers, 
computer parts, mobile phones and television parts. As China has emerged as one of the main 
destinations of Japanese FDI, intra-firm trade between Japanese parent companies and their 
affiliates in China has reinforced intra-industry trade between China and Japan. Leading 
manufacturing industries establish big plants in China, which are followed by parts and 
component manufacturers. 
The increase in imports from China and the massive FDI flows to China intensified the 
need for industrial adjustment, as a number of industries lost competitiveness in the Japanese 
domestic market. The perception of China as an economic threat increased, and China was 
blamed for export deflation because of its low export prices, the undervalued Chinese yuan, 
and the consequent hollowing out of Japanese industries.50 
Against this backdrop, Japanese subsidiaries in China today play a vital role in the 
development of China’s foreign trade, as most of their output is exported to Japan and third-
party countries. In this sense, FDI in China has been a critical factor in boosting intra-regional 
trade in East Asia. 
Japanese trading strategy has undergone a shift from that of selling finished goods to 
the Chinese domestic market to a series of activities concerned with ‘processing trade’, i.e. 
exporting parts and components to China, processing and assembling the finished goods in 
China, and then re-exporting them to Japan and third countries, using China as an export 
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platform for the global market. According to Dean et al. in 2007, 56.6 percent of China’s 
exports to Japan were processing exports.51  
As a result, trade patterns in East Asia have changed, with an increase in intra-regional 
and intra-industry trade and a shift in the commodity structure of trade from final to 
intermediate goods.52 Ando 53shows that the importance of intra-industry trade has increased 
sharply for machinery trade in general, but especially so in the case of the vertical intra-industry 
trade of machinery parts and components, whose share of the total trade in machinery parts and 
components rose from 18 percent in 1990 to 81 percent in 2000 for China and from 38 percent 
to 69 percent for Japan.54 This increase was due in the main to the international fragmentation 
of the production processes occurring primarily through foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).55 
In 2007, Japanese FIEs accounted for 86.9 percent of processing exports to Japan.56 
As Japanese subsidiaries in China increase their local content, they also share industrial 
infrastructure with local firms, integrating production chains with the participation of the 
Chinese labor force in labor-intensive segments of high added-value manufactured products, 
thereby improving productivity and efficiency in the local Chinese manufacturing industry. At 
the same time, intra-firm trade between Japanese parent firms and their affiliates in China 
greatly contributes to the intra-industry trade of the two economies. Moreover, Japanese FDI 
in China helps to create jobs, increase exports from China and transfer technology and know-
how to local Chinese firms, thus upgrading China’s industrial and trade structure and allowing 
China to use global marketing networks and Japanese brand names to sell made-in-China 
products on the global market. 
While external Chinese demand has certainly been crucial in preventing the Japanese 
economy from slumping into another recession, the Chinese economy is also taking advantage 
of Japanese FDI, made up of a package of capital, technology and know-how. China is in the 
middle of a global production chain, with Japan as the principal source of imported 
intermediates, most of which are processing intermediates. 
Japan and China share great mutual economic interests, in terms of both trade and 
investment, and Japanese FIEs play an important role in the global production chain. Japan is 
critical in helping Chinese industry improve its industrial capacity, productive variety and 
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productivity and, given that FDI is more stable than trade, Japan and China’s economic 
interdependence has also become much stronger. 
 
Analysis of Japan’s Hedging Strategy Towards China 
 
As indicated in the earlier theoretical discussion, the empirical evidence casts doubts on neo-
realist tenets and shows that small and middle powers are not limited to pursuing either pure 
balancing or pure bandwagoning strategies, but, rather, they tend to adopt a “middle position”, 
referred to by many as a “hedging strategy”. As outlined in section 2, it is our firm belief that 
Kuik’s concept of hedging can be used to describe Japanese policy towards China. In section 
3 we have seen how a combination of domestic and international factors led to a gradual shift 
away from the “friendship diplomacy” of the 1970s and 1980s to a new paradigm that is best 
understood in the light of Kuik’s model. As such, Japan finds itself today in a new phase of 
what has been labeled as “competitive engagement with a hard balance”, 57  although we 
consider it best described as a “hedging strategy” with elements of economic pragmatism, 
binding-engagement, dominance-denial and indirect balancing.58 
First of all, by adhering to a sort of economic-pragmatism, or a “business first” 
approach, Japan has attempted to maximize its economic interdependence with China through 
trade and investment, in spite of its political and security concerns. Tokyo has instigated a 
clearly pragmatic policy with China in the economic realm. Although Japan terminated its yen 
programs with China in 2008, Tokyo obviously favors promoting economic interdependence 
with China, and nowhere is this truer than in its trade and investment policies. As reported in 
section 3, in 2013 Japanese trade with China accounted for 20% of the total of Japan’s imports 
and exports, confirming China as Japan’s largest trading partner.  
Japan experienced a marked increase in its processing trade to China following the 
latter’s accession to the WTO, with Japan establishing itself as a key source of parts and 
components for China in the global supply chain. According to Dean et al.,59 about 74% of 
Chinese imports from Japan were intermediate goods, and nearly half of these intermediate 
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goods from Japan came to China under the processing trade regime, meaning that they were 
re-exported after processing. This in turn demonstrates both the importance of Japan in China’s 
global supply chain – as the main source of China’s imported intermediate goods – and the 
importance of vertical integration between Japanese and Chinese industries. Moreover, Japan 
has become the second largest source of FDI in China. Japanese FIEs are unquestionably the 
main vehicle for China’s integration in the global supply chain, as they account for the largest 
share of exports and most of its processing trade. As stated by Wan,60 “Japan wants China to 
grow, and China wants to see Japan recover quickly economically; the alternatives would hurt 
their national interests”.   
Secondly, Japan has pursued a strategy of binding-engagement in order to establish 
bilateral and multilateral channels of institutionalized communication to ‘socialize’ the 
superpower, to use the constructivists’ expression. As Ciorciari61 states, in the post-Cold War 
period the reduction in ideological hostility and the liberalization of the economic order, 
together with the subsequent establishment of new diplomatic forums, have provided the 
opportunity for strengthening these channels of communication. Whether or not these 
institutions are mere “talk shops” (as the realists would assert), a sort of “soft” regional and  
interregional dialogue has emerged between Japan and China, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF),62 the Japan-China Security Dialogue (from 1993 onward), the Japan-China 
Counter-Terrorism Consultations (2011), the Japan-China High Level Consultation on 
Maritime Affairs (2012) and ASEAN+3 and various economic forums including the East Asia 
Summit, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), 
ASEAN+6, ASEAN+8, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Forum of East Asia-Latin America 
and the Round of Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between Japan, China and South 
Korea. 
For Japan, binding China to the main regional and international institutions, as well as 
creating predictable channels of communication, is a way of involving China in Western 
international regimes and of promoting its role as a “responsible stakeholder”. As discussed, 
following the Tiananmen Square incident Japan pursued a clear policy of engagement in order 
to induce China to behave benignly and to bring it back into the international community. In 
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the same vein, China’s accession to the WTO represented not only a considerable boost to trade 
and investment, but also the acceptance of the rules and norms of international trade, ultimately 
making China a more predictable and reliable power in the economic realm. Other relevant 
examples of binding-engagement are provided by ASEAN+3 and the EAS where the Chinese 
and the Japanese governments have taken a range of initiatives aimed at discussing specific 
issues, including energy efficiency, oil stockpiling and confidence-building measures on 
fishing rules.63 
Kuik argues that binding-engagement and dominance-denial are, in a way, two sides of 
the same coin. Accordingly, Japan has, in third place, adopted a visible dominance-denial 
attitude, seeking not only to involve other powers in persuading China to be engaged and to 
behave in a benign way, but also to prevent the emergence of a regionally and globally 
dominant China by involving other countries in the Asian-Pacific regional architecture. 
Tokyo’s enmeshment in this regional architecture can be explained not only in terms of its 
willingness to bandwagon with the most dynamic region in the world and of its efforts to have 
a foreign policy that is more independent of the United States, but also in terms of its attempts 
to counter the rise of China. 
Since Japan cannot solve the systemic problem of China’s rise on its own, it has 
involved powers that are not strictly located in East Asia, including the United States, India, 
Australia and New Zealand, countries that Japan considers as forming an “arc of freedom and 
prosperity”.64 Following a more assertive attitude from China after the 2008 financial crisis, 
South-East Asian countries are also greatly concerned by China’s rise, and have sought 
indirectly to counterbalance China’s assertiveness towards the United States and Japan.  
One of the most prominent examples of this strategy in the recent period has been the 
establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a mega-regional free trade agreement 
concerned not only with tariff reductions but also with rewriting the rules of international trade. 
The TPP was signed by 12 Pacific Rim countries, including the United States, Japan, Mexico, 
Vietnam and Australia, but it intentionally excludes China. Although China was invited by the 
United States to join negotiations in 2012, more recently the Obama administration has 
explicitly excluded China on the grounds that it cannot meet the high standards agreed to in the 
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Treaty. However, the exclusion of China from the TPP should also be seen as part of a 
Japanese-American strategy to contain the increasing economic and political power of China 
in the Asia-Pacific region.65  
As a reaction to US-Japanese attempts to avoid any dominance of China in Asian 
regionalism, Beijing has taken a two-track approach: while it participates in such institutions 
as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the ADB, at the same time it seeks to promote the 
importance of alternative institutions. These include the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (an ASEAN+6 proposal for the Asian Pacific, including Japan, India and South 
Korea), an alternative free trade agreement to that of the TPP, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative, an alternative to the United States’ Asia 
Pivot strategy.  
Finally, Japan is pursuing a strategy of indirect balancing against China in the field of 
security or a “just-in-case” strategy. Given the uncertainties about China’s actual intentions, 
Japan has made preparations for the worst-case scenario: a hostile hegemonic China. Although 
none of the documents on foreign policy (NDPO, Araki Report, SCC, etc.) describe China in 
hostile terms, Japan is concerned about episodes of ongoing friction with the country. As 
discussed in section 3, China’s Law of the Territorial Sea (which intimates that it might use 
force to assert its claims over Senkaku), Chinese nuclear testing, Chinese military exercises in 
the Taiwan Straits, various incidents involving Chinese vessels and the Japanese Coast Guard, 
incursions by Chinese submarines into Japanese territorial waters in Ryuku and the 
strengthening and modernization of its military power throughout the 1990s are especially 
disquieting for strategists in Tokyo.  
In response, Japan’s strategy has been to increase its own military capabilities and to 
strengthen its security alliance with the United States, without however identifying China as a 
direct threat. As for its indirect internal balancing, Japan has made clear in its official 
documents that the recent acquisition of a new ballistic missile defense system,66 the Sea-Based 
Midcourse Defense (SMD) system, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, and the modernization of 
its Self-Defense Forces should be understood as a means of protecting the country and it 
citizens against possible threats of terrorism and from the North Korean regime. Nevertheless, 
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these measures must also be seen as a response to China’s rise in military power. Under Abe, 
Japan has created a new National Security Council to coordinate its foreign and security policy 
and it has updated its National Security Strategy and released new National Defense Program 
Guidelines (2013).   
As for its external balancing, Japan has strengthened its alliance with the United States 
thanks to the Joint Security Declaration signed by Hashimoto and Clinton, the new Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines (1997), the October 2000 Armitage Report, Koizumi’s Seven Point 
Plan to support the American fight against terrorism (September 2001), the Basic Self-Defense 
Forces Plan to enable the sending of the SDF into the Indian Ocean (November 2001), the 
Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (July 2003), 
and the report issued by the Araki Commission (October, 2004). All these measures are 
evidence of Japan’s external balancing against the rise of China, a strategy that has recently 
been confirmed under the US’s “pivot to Asia” program. In line with Obama’s “rebalancing” 
strategy, over the last four years Abe Shinzo has issued a new Mid-Term Defense Plan aimed 
at increasing interoperability with US forces and Japan has participated with the US in the 
procurement of the V-22 Osprey aircraft, a Joint Strike Strategy, and SM-3 Missiles. One of 
Abe’s most recent measures has been the controversial reinterpretation of the Constitution, 
recognizing Japan’s right to collective self-defense, that is, to make a greater contribution to 




This article has argued that the Japanese response to China’s rise cannot be adequately 
explained in terms of realist or liberal traditions alone. First, realism fails to provide sufficient 
coverage of the vast array of strategies available to a nation when seeking to deal with a rising 
power. Realist tenets are, therefore, overly simplistic in their claim that, when faced with a 
rising power, states are likely to opt for either internal and external balancing or bandwagoning. 
Were this to be true, Japan would surely have become a great power with its own nuclear 
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capability and massive conventional forces, something that is eminently not the case. Most of 
the realist literature, besides confusing the concept of the normalization of Japanese foreign 
policy with the concept of militarism, fails to take into consideration the many brakes operating 
within Japanese society, including its aversion to militarism, the long-held norm of pacifism, 
the obstacles to amending the Japanese constitution and the need to obtain a qualified majority 
in the National Diet to do so. 
Second, realism assumes that Japan will pursue a cooperative strategy to induce benign 
intentions on the part of China while simultaneously strengthening the Japanese-American 
security treaty in the face of a future threat from China. Likewise, Japan is expected to foster 
its alliance with the US by becoming less of a “buck-passer” and, so, reducing the danger of 
abandonment by Washington. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, from the perspective of 
offensive realism such action could result in China seeing this stronger alliance as a means of 
containing them, and so it could intensify the “security dilemma” between the two neighboring 
countries. Addressing the potential problem of US abandonment in the “alliance dilemma” 
could increase the classic “security dilemma”. In short, it is far from easy for Japan to pursue 
a cooperative strategy toward a rising China, and realists do not really offer a feasible 
explanation. 
Meanwhile, liberal traditions consider that cooperation in IR results from common 
vested interests in such issues as trade and economic interdependence. For liberals, it is not that 
actors are not selfish; on the contrary, it is the logic of collective action that allows them to 
achieve a win-win situation. Therefore, given Japan and China’s enormous economic 
interdependence, in liberal eyes the relationship between the two countries should be very 
robust. However, as this article has demonstrated, relations in the political and security spheres 
have not only worsened, but over the last few years a number of past episodes have reemerged, 
including the revision of history textbooks, and the disputes over the Senkaku Islands and the 
EEZ.  
The main argument of this article, therefore, is that some middle powers adopt policies 
that differ quite markedly from pure forms of balancing and bandwagoning. Instead, they seek 
to take a “middle” course that might be labeled a “hedging strategy”. Thus, Japan is pursuing 
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a cooperative strategy vis-à-vis China aimed at fostering its benign intentions, but at the same 
time it is hedging against the possible failure of such engagement by strengthening its alliance 
with the US and bolstering its military force. As outlined in section 4, over the last 20 years 
Tokyo has been pursuing what Kuik calls pure hedging. If we take recent events into 
consideration, what is clear is that Japan’s foreign policy adheres closely to Kuik’s hedging 
model, as opposed to what Hornung understands as a hedging strategy. Japan is not powerful 
enough to balance against the rise of China, yet it is too strong to simply bandwagon with China. 
For Japan, hedging represents not only a means for offsetting risk in an uncertain world, but it 
is also the natural position of a strong actor with great capabilities. As a middle power, Japan 
tends to hedge, seeking to take advantage of its engagement strategy toward China via 
economic cooperation and growing interdependence.  
The rise of China has drastically changed Japan’s trading patterns and industrial 
structure. Today, China is Japan’s main trading partner in terms of total trade, and Chinese 
imports to Japan have grown steadily over the century. At the same time, China has emerged 
as one of the leading destinations of Japanese FDI, and Japanese FIEs play an important role 
in its global production chain. Japanese subsidiaries are the main actors of the “processing 
trade”, using China as both a processing and assembly platform, before exporting the finished 
products to Japan and third countries. In this process two features stand out: first that Japan is 
the main source of China’s imported intermediate goods and, second, the vertical integration 
between Japanese and Chinese industries is of great importance. 
 While external Chinese demand has been critical for the survival of the Japanese 
economy, Japanese subsidiaries in China help to create jobs, boost exports from China and 
transfer technology and know-how to local Chinese firms, improving the country’s industrial 
capacity, productive variety and productivity. Since FDI is more stable and more permanent 
than trade, Japan and China’s economic interdependence has become much stronger.  
Japan has also opened up channels of communication with China via a number of 
regional and interregional dialogues, including the Japan-China Security Dialogue, ASEM and 
ASEAN+3, with the aim of socializing China and making its neighbor a more responsible 
stakeholder. However, Japan is also hedging against the possible threat that China might come 
                  27 
 
to pose in the future not only by seeking to thwart Chinese attempts to dominate regionally and 
globally, but also by bolstering its Self-Defense Forces (internal balancing) and by expanding 
its security alliance with the US (external balancing). Today, Tokyo provides support to its 
allies (the United States), gives demonstrations of its power to its enemies (North Korea), and 
proposes neutrality to its likely adversaries (China).  
Finally, one last question needs to be addressed in our analysis of hedging:  What 
factors will determine Japan’s long term action vis-à-vis China? We assume a priori that these 
determinants will be a combination of national (domestic restructuring and leader-driven) and 
international factors (external shocks or beiatsu). However, it seems that three factors are likely 
to determine whether the current tendency to pursue a hedging strategy will be reverted in the 
future (i.e. pursuing bandwagoning or balancing strategies): the immediacy of a real threat, the 
existence of ideological fault-lines, and the existence of an all-out great power rivalry between 
the rising power (China) and the dominant power (the United States).67 As soon as one of these 
factors emerges, hedging will no longer be possible. 
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Table 2: Japanese outward direct investment 
              (Net flows per hundred million yen) 
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 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
World 69.896 49.388 85.872 97.782 132.485 
Asia 19.427 19.035 31.209 26.778 39.775 
        China 6.492 6.284 10.046 10.759 8.870 
        ASEAN 6.587 7.710 15.491 8.586 23.331 
        North America  10.207 7.810 11.879 28.629 45.730 
            U.S.A. 9.989 7.968 11.530 25.609 42.964 
Europe 16.680 12.781 31.437 24.748 31.596 
 
 
                                                       Source: Balance of Payment Statistics (Bank of Japan) 
 
 
